Across the Bay

Friday, July 28, 2006

L'Etat C'est Moi

If true, this is a very disturbing story:

Several suspected spies were shot dead in the southern Lebanese port of Tyre, witness said on Thursday.

Passengers on board an evacuation ship told medical doctor Boris Buck from the German city of Munich that they had seen members of the Lebanese Shi'ite Hezbollah group or their sympathisers killing 18 Lebanese people during the night.

The victims were suspected of helping the Israeli air force pick out targets.

This is yet another indication that Hezbollah's plan all along was a classic coup d'etat, very similar, as Pierre Akel recently wrote, to the fascisti's takeover in Italy. The myth that Hezbollah's weapons were not aimed at the interior was always a laughable fig leaf, and it was already unmasked even before the current crisis. As Martin Kramer put it, "[t]he Nasrallah personality cult has been a way to keep the faithful in line. Not so long ago, Hezbollah thugs took to the streets after a Lebanese television station broadcast a satire of Nasrallah. The mob burned tires and cars. The episode showed that Nasrallah's moral standing had slipped, and that the movement had been reduced to intimidation to keep up the facade."

But this is the clearest example, the most tragic and disturbing example, of what Hezbollah had in mind, and how it saw itself, the Lebanese government, and the Lebanese people. When stupid Hezbollah groupies in the West regurgitate the party's "romantic" line that it is akin to the French resistance, this is what they are justifying: extrajudicial martial law by a non-state actor, in the full presence of a state and its institutions! Hezbollah believes it has the right to hold Lebanese citizens and dispense with due process and execute them on the spot. It is beyond outrageous, and gives a whole new meaning to Nasrallah's threat, which was understood by Walid Jumblatt: "As for his saying that whoever supports me deserves praise and whoever does not will be held accountable, that is a message. We received the message."

Update: Caveman provides another example of how the myth of the function of Hezbollah's weapons has been exposed for what it is:

Residents who have recently escaped from Mari tell of a dramatic, desperate situation in the village. The Druse residents, who have no affinity at all for Hizbullah, resisted Hizbullah's attempts to enter the village. The IAF apparently and unwittingly assisted in their resistance by bombing the roads leading into the village, cutting off the militia's ability to enter the town, at least temporarily. Hizbullah responded by cutting off the town's electricity and water supply, essentially laying seige to a town on its own side of the border, hoping that its residents would pack up and leave. Many of them have done so. My sources say that Hizbullah has been desperate to enter the village but has as of yet been unable to do so in large numbers. Residents also describe a growing humanitarian crisis in the village due to the lack of fresh water.
Hizbullah attempted to enter Mari not to defend it from attackers, but so they could fire rockets from the village toward Israel. Hizbullah's intention was to bring Israeli reprisals on the town, ostensibly to destroy or damage it significantly, and to cause greater civilian suffering. Hizbullah's MO and tactics are well-known in the south. However, Druse typically defend their own villages, and in the case of Mari (a place I have been to several times, many of whose residents I know personally), the residents have desperately tried to keep Hizbullah fighters out of their area.

Update 2: Rampurple offers another example from Ain Ebel, via a story in the NYT.