Liberalism and Arabism: A Reprise
I decided to revisit this theme in the wake of the recent arrest of Syrian liberal Nabil Fayyad. The Syrians have been under immense pressure so they retorted to what they do best.
So I take this opportunity to use Nabil Fayyad to contrast the positions of the emerging liberals and libertarians in the Levant with the old, but still dominant, Arabist fascism. For those who have not yet heard me or Joshua Landis talk about him, Fayyad is a liberal (Sunni) Syrian intellectual. A pharmacologist by profession, he studied Christian theology in Lebanon and translated several Western books to Arabic (see his short bio and list of publications here [Arabic]). He is one of the leading voices of liberalism in Syria, and the official spokesman of the Liberal Gathering of Syria (Arabic).
Fayyad wrote a couple of introductory pieces on Liberalism and Libertarianism for the website of the Liberal Gathering. The whole thing shows that there are people in Syria who are truly seeking a place of their own, clearly relying on Western thought without any of the hang-ups of the "anti-West" fools who dominate the scene in the region. The page also features a piece on the "Syrian Christians and the Clash of the Two Globalizations." The piece shows the tricky situation facing the Christians of the ME. I will come back to it at the end of the post.
For now, let me begin with Fayyad's piece on "Classical Liberalism" (Arabic) (see also here, here, and here, all in Arabic). A Lebanese-American reader on Joshua Landis' site once asked why Arabism is regarded as a fascist ideology. There's no better way to show why than by contrasting Fayyad's exposé on classical liberalism with the views of Arabism's (pseudo-)"philosopher," Sati' al-Husri.
On the views of the classical liberals, Fayyad writes:
"This school of thought focused on the primary importance of individual being unburdened by the power of the State. The central ideas of this school of thought are the importance of individuals and their freedom. The classical liberals tended to prefer the free market economy, and rejected government interference in the economy. Historically, liberalism opposed mercantilism and what it considered Socialism, and specifically Marxism, in addition to any form of group principle."
"The Group Principle" (al-mabda’ al-jama‛y) is by the way the etymology of "fascism" (Italian fascismo, from fascio, "group," from Late Latin fascium, from Latin fascis, "bundle.") as well as its definition as a political system (a system of government marked by centralization of authority, stringent socioeconomic controls, suppression of the opposition through terror and censorship, and typically a policy of belligerent nationalism and racism.)
Let's compare the above with Husri's views. I'm quoting from Martin Kramer's essay "Arab Nationalism: Mistaken Identity" and Adeed Dawisha's article "Requiem for Arab Nationalism."
Writes Kramer:
"Faced with masses of people who had not chosen to be Arabs, the Arab nationalists developed a doctrine that denied them any other choice. Between the wars, the Arab nationalists progressively discarded the French idea of the nation as a voluntary contract, formed by individuals to secure their liberty. Increasingly their nation resembled the German Volk, a natural nation above all human volition, bound by the mystery of language and lore. Only the unity of this nation could restore its greatness, even if the price of unity meant the surrender of freedom.
This struggle had to be conducted not only against imperialism, but also against the would-be Arabs themselves. Not all of them were eager to be Arabs, and some openly professed to be something else. In such instances, Arab nationalism assigned itself the task of educating them to an Arab identity, preferably by persuasion but if necessary by compulsion. According to Sati' al-Husri, Arab nationalism's first true ideologue and a confidant of Faysal,
Every person who speaks Arabic is an Arab. Everyone who is affiliated with these people is an Arab. If he does not know this or if he does not cherish his Arabism, then we must study the reasons for his position. It may be the result of ignorance — then we must teach him the truth. It may be because he is unaware or deceived — then we must awaken him and reassure him. It may be a result of selfishness — then we must work to limit his selfishness.
This ominous passage presaged the drift of Arab nationalism away from the liberal model of a voluntary community. "We can say that the system to which we should direct our hopes and aspirations is a Fascist system," wrote al-Husri in 1930, raising the slogan of "solidarity, obedience, and sacrifice." The idea of the nation as an obedient army immediately appealed to the army itself, especially its officers. It went hand in hand with a growing militarism, and the belief that only the armed forces could rise above the "selfishness" of the sect and clan, enforcing discipline on the nation."
Dawisha expands on this theme:
"The tenets of Arab nationalism, as formulated by Sati‘ al-Husri, reflected the ideas of nineteenth-century German cultural nationalism. To German nationalist thinkers, unifying the nation was the supreme goal and a sacred act, which necessitated the subordination of individual will to the national will. Notions of liberty or freedom were distractions, and when they contradicted the national will, they had to be repressed. How else would the eminent German historian, Heinrich von Trietschke, justify the annexation in 1871 of the German-speaking population of Alsace, the majority of whom wanted to remain politically within France? "We desire," Trietschke writes in a chilling tone, "even against their will, to restore them to themselves."
English and French nationalisms were the ideological responses to indigenous efforts to liberalize the absolutist state and create a liberal and virtuous society. German nationalism, in contrast, sought not to
secure better government, individual liberty, and due process of law, but ... to drive out a foreign ruler and to secure national independence. The word liberty did not mean primarily, as it did for the western peoples the assertion of the rights of the individual against his government, but of the independence of the nation against foreign rule ... When the western peoples strove for regeneration, they were primarily concerned with individual liberty; in central and eastern Europe the demand for regeneration often centered on the unity and power of the group.
This was the intellectual legacy upon which Husri built his theory of the Arab nation. Arab nationalism, until its final decline late in the twentieth century, continued to embody the tenets of German cultural nationalism. Arab nationalists advocated the rejuvenation of the Arab nation, its political unity, its secularism, and its sovereignty. Yet Arab nationalists, infused with the illiberal ideas of cultural nationalism, had almost nothing to say about personal liberty and freedom. Husri once said that
the form of government was of no great interest to him ... public attention should focus on the problem of unity: it [was] the national duty of every Arab to support the leader who is capable of achieving Arab unity.
On the rare occasions when advocates of Arab nationalism mentioned personal liberty, it was to make it conditional upon the nation's well being. In the words of Husri himself: "patriotism and nationalism before and above all ... even above and before freedom." Husri aimed this message especially at those Arabic-speaking people who did not share his views, and who might have been less than ablaze with exuberance at the prospect of being called Arabs. Husri's response is uncompromising:
Under no circumstances should we say: "As long as [an Arab] does not wish to be an Arab, and as long as he is disdainful of his Arabism, then he is not an Arab." He is an Arab whether he wishes to be one or not. Whether ignorant, indifferent, undutiful, or disloyal, he is an Arab, but an Arab without feelings or consciousness, and perhaps even without conscience.
Husri did not offer remedies—specific methods by which "Arabs without conscience" would be, in Trietschke's words, "restored to themselves." Michel Aflaq was not so coy. Aflaq, whose writings bear the unmistakable influence of Husri's ideas, candidly identified "cruelty" as the most reliable instrument to effect the desired transformation: "When we are cruel to others, we know that our cruelty is in order to bring them back to their true selves, of which they are ignorant." Indeed, Aflaq defined cruelty as a facet of the nationalist's love for his people.
Husri's nationalist beliefs were carried over into the 1950s and 1960s, becoming the slogans of the nationalist avalanche. By then, Arab cultural nationalism had emerged triumphant over other competing ideologies and identities, capturing the hearts and minds of that quintessentially nationalist generation, a generation that fervently believed in Arab nationalism as the elixir by which a glittering past would be transformed into a glorious future.
...
Husri's intellectual authoritarianism penetrated the nationalist psyche and was reinforced by the political circumstances of the era. The nationalist generation of the 1950s and 1960s came to believe fervently that the West would deliberately and effectively block the goals of Arab nationalism, that it would see the nationalist vision of an independent and assertive Arab nation as a dangerous move against Western economic and political interests in the area. The nationalist struggle, therefore, became essentially a struggle against the West.
In the midst of this nationalist ferment emerged the charismatic Abdel Nasser. He vilified the West as the perfidious "other," the undying nemesis of the Arabs, the determined obstacle to their progress. In fiery speeches, Abdel Nasser reminded Arabs continuously of their glorious history and of their military and intellectual superiority over the West. All the catch phrases of Husri's cultural nationalism were there: the glory of the Arabs' heritage, the excellence and originality of their forefathers, the overwhelming power of the Arabs when they were united, their ensuing weakness as they quarreled and dissolved into many small entities, and the necessity to unite now in order to be free and strong again.
In promising the Arabs freedom, Abdel Nasser echoed Husri's conception; it was not personal freedom and liberty, rather, it was freedom from Western domination. Liberal democracy had no place in this new order. Abdel Nasser did not offer it; he disdained it. "The separation of powers," he once said, "is nothing but a big deception, because there really is no such thing as the separation of powers." But neither did the nationalist multitude in those heady days ask for democracy, let alone demand it. The illiberal intellectual tradition of cultural nationalism, combined with the anti-Western struggle, which reached a crescendo in the 1950s and 1960s, justified the centralization of power in the minds of most Arabs, and contributed to the emergence of Abdel Nasser's popular, populist, and authoritarian rule.
The Baath Party, the other leader of the Arab nationalist march, followed a parallel route. The custodians of Baathist ideology focused their intellectual energies on "Arab unity" and the "anti-imperialist struggle" but said little about democratic institutions. While the constitution of the Baath Party did assert the principle of the people's sovereignty and Baathist support for a constitutional elective system, it also gave the Baathist party the central role in determining the scope and extent of political freedoms. From the very beginning, Aflaq's ideas were endowed with a "strong statist strain [in which] individual self-realization [would] derive from participation in the general will of the community." Freedom would be associated with the struggle against imperialism rather than with individual liberty.[48] This illiberal orientation would be reinforced during the party's flirtation with political power in the 1950s and early 1960s. In the party's sixth national congress held in 1963, the Baath finally and unequivocally rejected the notion of liberal parliamentarianism, espousing instead the Soviet concept of democratic centralism, based upon the party's role as the "vanguard" political institution in the state."
These long segments were well-worth quoting as they embody the definition of fascism, with its absolutism, its Statism, its xenophobia, its authoritarianism, and its annihilation of difference and opposition, and thus of critical thought. Contrast that with Fayyad's quote:
"Liberalism entered the world as critique, critique of the institutions of political and religious authority, and a critique of the old system."
This therefore extends the criticism not just to Arabism but to Islamism, and beyond it to Islam proper. As Fayyad notes, liberalism is rooted in the humanist tradition of the Renaissance and the ideas of the Enlightenment. Both these cultural revolutions have no parallel in Islam, hence any notion of criticism is taken as an attack on authority, and the divine, and thus is something to be quashed. The linking of such critical thought, and those who espouse it, with the West means that the elements of fascism (absolutism, authoritarianism, and xenophobia) have been trasnported to Islam, where it defines itself in opposition to the West. In that sense, there is a real culture war, not just between western humanism and Arab fascism and Islamic obscurantism, but also within Islam and against Arab nationalism.
In light of that, the ME Christians, who are often the middlemen in these cross-cultural dynamics, are in a hot spot indeed. This anxiety emanating from this "clash" (I won't say it!) is reflected in this piece on the same Syrian website. The Syrian Christians are fearful of "two globalizations," the Islamist and the "American." It's interesting to see that there are really no specific points of criticism against "American globalization" in the piece (there are only two cliché adjectives: "colonial and self-serving characteristics")! The real criticism is directed at the "Islamist globalization." That's interesting but also normal. The perceived "American globalization" doesn't hurt the Syrian Christians in and of itself. It hurts them only in that it presents the danger of them being perceived as belonging to the "Western camp" and thus the targets of reprisals.
Their criticism of "Islamist globalization" on the other hand, paints a much more specific picture:
"Islamist globalization is a terrifying danger for the Syrian Christians with its extremist ideas, and its legalization of the murders of the infidels, or their acceptance as dhimmis lacking rights and duties and its interference with their behavior and ways of life."
Unfortunately, dhimmitude is not the product of Islamism, but of Islam. So the Christians need to find a third way so as not to be identified with the Americans and face reprisals, nor to be second-class citizens. Mind you that this is the same situation that faced them a century ago in the aftermath of European colonialism and the fall of the Ottoman Empire. Back then, they went with the myth of Arabism, which as we showed above, was a disaster from the day it was born.
In this piece, the Syrian Christians present another twist: local and territorial Syrian nationalism, based on a Syrian identity and Ancient (read pre-Arab and pre-Islamic) Syrian heritage. This is not to be confused with Antoun Saadeh's ill-conceived ideology, which is parallel to Arab nationalism. This vision is not of an organic Volk. This is more akin to Lebanonism and Egyptianism that I explored earlier on the blog. It's what Fayyad himself explored in his pieces in "The Critic" (An-Naqed) which I quoted in my previous post on the subject.
Their cry for secularism is the echo of their predecessors' a century ago, because the central problem remains an unreformed Islam as a prism for inter-group relations. Hence the necessity of the cultural revolutions described by Fayyad, for and within Islam.
Nabil Fayyad is imprisoned by the Baathists, the products of Sati' al-Husri's and Michel Aflaq's fascism. That's the state of the ME, and that's why it must change
So I take this opportunity to use Nabil Fayyad to contrast the positions of the emerging liberals and libertarians in the Levant with the old, but still dominant, Arabist fascism. For those who have not yet heard me or Joshua Landis talk about him, Fayyad is a liberal (Sunni) Syrian intellectual. A pharmacologist by profession, he studied Christian theology in Lebanon and translated several Western books to Arabic (see his short bio and list of publications here [Arabic]). He is one of the leading voices of liberalism in Syria, and the official spokesman of the Liberal Gathering of Syria (Arabic).
Fayyad wrote a couple of introductory pieces on Liberalism and Libertarianism for the website of the Liberal Gathering. The whole thing shows that there are people in Syria who are truly seeking a place of their own, clearly relying on Western thought without any of the hang-ups of the "anti-West" fools who dominate the scene in the region. The page also features a piece on the "Syrian Christians and the Clash of the Two Globalizations." The piece shows the tricky situation facing the Christians of the ME. I will come back to it at the end of the post.
For now, let me begin with Fayyad's piece on "Classical Liberalism" (Arabic) (see also here, here, and here, all in Arabic). A Lebanese-American reader on Joshua Landis' site once asked why Arabism is regarded as a fascist ideology. There's no better way to show why than by contrasting Fayyad's exposé on classical liberalism with the views of Arabism's (pseudo-)"philosopher," Sati' al-Husri.
On the views of the classical liberals, Fayyad writes:
"This school of thought focused on the primary importance of individual being unburdened by the power of the State. The central ideas of this school of thought are the importance of individuals and their freedom. The classical liberals tended to prefer the free market economy, and rejected government interference in the economy. Historically, liberalism opposed mercantilism and what it considered Socialism, and specifically Marxism, in addition to any form of group principle."
"The Group Principle" (al-mabda’ al-jama‛y) is by the way the etymology of "fascism" (Italian fascismo, from fascio, "group," from Late Latin fascium, from Latin fascis, "bundle.") as well as its definition as a political system (a system of government marked by centralization of authority, stringent socioeconomic controls, suppression of the opposition through terror and censorship, and typically a policy of belligerent nationalism and racism.)
Let's compare the above with Husri's views. I'm quoting from Martin Kramer's essay "Arab Nationalism: Mistaken Identity" and Adeed Dawisha's article "Requiem for Arab Nationalism."
Writes Kramer:
"Faced with masses of people who had not chosen to be Arabs, the Arab nationalists developed a doctrine that denied them any other choice. Between the wars, the Arab nationalists progressively discarded the French idea of the nation as a voluntary contract, formed by individuals to secure their liberty. Increasingly their nation resembled the German Volk, a natural nation above all human volition, bound by the mystery of language and lore. Only the unity of this nation could restore its greatness, even if the price of unity meant the surrender of freedom.
This struggle had to be conducted not only against imperialism, but also against the would-be Arabs themselves. Not all of them were eager to be Arabs, and some openly professed to be something else. In such instances, Arab nationalism assigned itself the task of educating them to an Arab identity, preferably by persuasion but if necessary by compulsion. According to Sati' al-Husri, Arab nationalism's first true ideologue and a confidant of Faysal,
Every person who speaks Arabic is an Arab. Everyone who is affiliated with these people is an Arab. If he does not know this or if he does not cherish his Arabism, then we must study the reasons for his position. It may be the result of ignorance — then we must teach him the truth. It may be because he is unaware or deceived — then we must awaken him and reassure him. It may be a result of selfishness — then we must work to limit his selfishness.
This ominous passage presaged the drift of Arab nationalism away from the liberal model of a voluntary community. "We can say that the system to which we should direct our hopes and aspirations is a Fascist system," wrote al-Husri in 1930, raising the slogan of "solidarity, obedience, and sacrifice." The idea of the nation as an obedient army immediately appealed to the army itself, especially its officers. It went hand in hand with a growing militarism, and the belief that only the armed forces could rise above the "selfishness" of the sect and clan, enforcing discipline on the nation."
Dawisha expands on this theme:
"The tenets of Arab nationalism, as formulated by Sati‘ al-Husri, reflected the ideas of nineteenth-century German cultural nationalism. To German nationalist thinkers, unifying the nation was the supreme goal and a sacred act, which necessitated the subordination of individual will to the national will. Notions of liberty or freedom were distractions, and when they contradicted the national will, they had to be repressed. How else would the eminent German historian, Heinrich von Trietschke, justify the annexation in 1871 of the German-speaking population of Alsace, the majority of whom wanted to remain politically within France? "We desire," Trietschke writes in a chilling tone, "even against their will, to restore them to themselves."
English and French nationalisms were the ideological responses to indigenous efforts to liberalize the absolutist state and create a liberal and virtuous society. German nationalism, in contrast, sought not to
secure better government, individual liberty, and due process of law, but ... to drive out a foreign ruler and to secure national independence. The word liberty did not mean primarily, as it did for the western peoples the assertion of the rights of the individual against his government, but of the independence of the nation against foreign rule ... When the western peoples strove for regeneration, they were primarily concerned with individual liberty; in central and eastern Europe the demand for regeneration often centered on the unity and power of the group.
This was the intellectual legacy upon which Husri built his theory of the Arab nation. Arab nationalism, until its final decline late in the twentieth century, continued to embody the tenets of German cultural nationalism. Arab nationalists advocated the rejuvenation of the Arab nation, its political unity, its secularism, and its sovereignty. Yet Arab nationalists, infused with the illiberal ideas of cultural nationalism, had almost nothing to say about personal liberty and freedom. Husri once said that
the form of government was of no great interest to him ... public attention should focus on the problem of unity: it [was] the national duty of every Arab to support the leader who is capable of achieving Arab unity.
On the rare occasions when advocates of Arab nationalism mentioned personal liberty, it was to make it conditional upon the nation's well being. In the words of Husri himself: "patriotism and nationalism before and above all ... even above and before freedom." Husri aimed this message especially at those Arabic-speaking people who did not share his views, and who might have been less than ablaze with exuberance at the prospect of being called Arabs. Husri's response is uncompromising:
Under no circumstances should we say: "As long as [an Arab] does not wish to be an Arab, and as long as he is disdainful of his Arabism, then he is not an Arab." He is an Arab whether he wishes to be one or not. Whether ignorant, indifferent, undutiful, or disloyal, he is an Arab, but an Arab without feelings or consciousness, and perhaps even without conscience.
Husri did not offer remedies—specific methods by which "Arabs without conscience" would be, in Trietschke's words, "restored to themselves." Michel Aflaq was not so coy. Aflaq, whose writings bear the unmistakable influence of Husri's ideas, candidly identified "cruelty" as the most reliable instrument to effect the desired transformation: "When we are cruel to others, we know that our cruelty is in order to bring them back to their true selves, of which they are ignorant." Indeed, Aflaq defined cruelty as a facet of the nationalist's love for his people.
Husri's nationalist beliefs were carried over into the 1950s and 1960s, becoming the slogans of the nationalist avalanche. By then, Arab cultural nationalism had emerged triumphant over other competing ideologies and identities, capturing the hearts and minds of that quintessentially nationalist generation, a generation that fervently believed in Arab nationalism as the elixir by which a glittering past would be transformed into a glorious future.
...
Husri's intellectual authoritarianism penetrated the nationalist psyche and was reinforced by the political circumstances of the era. The nationalist generation of the 1950s and 1960s came to believe fervently that the West would deliberately and effectively block the goals of Arab nationalism, that it would see the nationalist vision of an independent and assertive Arab nation as a dangerous move against Western economic and political interests in the area. The nationalist struggle, therefore, became essentially a struggle against the West.
In the midst of this nationalist ferment emerged the charismatic Abdel Nasser. He vilified the West as the perfidious "other," the undying nemesis of the Arabs, the determined obstacle to their progress. In fiery speeches, Abdel Nasser reminded Arabs continuously of their glorious history and of their military and intellectual superiority over the West. All the catch phrases of Husri's cultural nationalism were there: the glory of the Arabs' heritage, the excellence and originality of their forefathers, the overwhelming power of the Arabs when they were united, their ensuing weakness as they quarreled and dissolved into many small entities, and the necessity to unite now in order to be free and strong again.
In promising the Arabs freedom, Abdel Nasser echoed Husri's conception; it was not personal freedom and liberty, rather, it was freedom from Western domination. Liberal democracy had no place in this new order. Abdel Nasser did not offer it; he disdained it. "The separation of powers," he once said, "is nothing but a big deception, because there really is no such thing as the separation of powers." But neither did the nationalist multitude in those heady days ask for democracy, let alone demand it. The illiberal intellectual tradition of cultural nationalism, combined with the anti-Western struggle, which reached a crescendo in the 1950s and 1960s, justified the centralization of power in the minds of most Arabs, and contributed to the emergence of Abdel Nasser's popular, populist, and authoritarian rule.
The Baath Party, the other leader of the Arab nationalist march, followed a parallel route. The custodians of Baathist ideology focused their intellectual energies on "Arab unity" and the "anti-imperialist struggle" but said little about democratic institutions. While the constitution of the Baath Party did assert the principle of the people's sovereignty and Baathist support for a constitutional elective system, it also gave the Baathist party the central role in determining the scope and extent of political freedoms. From the very beginning, Aflaq's ideas were endowed with a "strong statist strain [in which] individual self-realization [would] derive from participation in the general will of the community." Freedom would be associated with the struggle against imperialism rather than with individual liberty.[48] This illiberal orientation would be reinforced during the party's flirtation with political power in the 1950s and early 1960s. In the party's sixth national congress held in 1963, the Baath finally and unequivocally rejected the notion of liberal parliamentarianism, espousing instead the Soviet concept of democratic centralism, based upon the party's role as the "vanguard" political institution in the state."
These long segments were well-worth quoting as they embody the definition of fascism, with its absolutism, its Statism, its xenophobia, its authoritarianism, and its annihilation of difference and opposition, and thus of critical thought. Contrast that with Fayyad's quote:
"Liberalism entered the world as critique, critique of the institutions of political and religious authority, and a critique of the old system."
This therefore extends the criticism not just to Arabism but to Islamism, and beyond it to Islam proper. As Fayyad notes, liberalism is rooted in the humanist tradition of the Renaissance and the ideas of the Enlightenment. Both these cultural revolutions have no parallel in Islam, hence any notion of criticism is taken as an attack on authority, and the divine, and thus is something to be quashed. The linking of such critical thought, and those who espouse it, with the West means that the elements of fascism (absolutism, authoritarianism, and xenophobia) have been trasnported to Islam, where it defines itself in opposition to the West. In that sense, there is a real culture war, not just between western humanism and Arab fascism and Islamic obscurantism, but also within Islam and against Arab nationalism.
In light of that, the ME Christians, who are often the middlemen in these cross-cultural dynamics, are in a hot spot indeed. This anxiety emanating from this "clash" (I won't say it!) is reflected in this piece on the same Syrian website. The Syrian Christians are fearful of "two globalizations," the Islamist and the "American." It's interesting to see that there are really no specific points of criticism against "American globalization" in the piece (there are only two cliché adjectives: "colonial and self-serving characteristics")! The real criticism is directed at the "Islamist globalization." That's interesting but also normal. The perceived "American globalization" doesn't hurt the Syrian Christians in and of itself. It hurts them only in that it presents the danger of them being perceived as belonging to the "Western camp" and thus the targets of reprisals.
Their criticism of "Islamist globalization" on the other hand, paints a much more specific picture:
"Islamist globalization is a terrifying danger for the Syrian Christians with its extremist ideas, and its legalization of the murders of the infidels, or their acceptance as dhimmis lacking rights and duties and its interference with their behavior and ways of life."
Unfortunately, dhimmitude is not the product of Islamism, but of Islam. So the Christians need to find a third way so as not to be identified with the Americans and face reprisals, nor to be second-class citizens. Mind you that this is the same situation that faced them a century ago in the aftermath of European colonialism and the fall of the Ottoman Empire. Back then, they went with the myth of Arabism, which as we showed above, was a disaster from the day it was born.
In this piece, the Syrian Christians present another twist: local and territorial Syrian nationalism, based on a Syrian identity and Ancient (read pre-Arab and pre-Islamic) Syrian heritage. This is not to be confused with Antoun Saadeh's ill-conceived ideology, which is parallel to Arab nationalism. This vision is not of an organic Volk. This is more akin to Lebanonism and Egyptianism that I explored earlier on the blog. It's what Fayyad himself explored in his pieces in "The Critic" (An-Naqed) which I quoted in my previous post on the subject.
Their cry for secularism is the echo of their predecessors' a century ago, because the central problem remains an unreformed Islam as a prism for inter-group relations. Hence the necessity of the cultural revolutions described by Fayyad, for and within Islam.
Nabil Fayyad is imprisoned by the Baathists, the products of Sati' al-Husri's and Michel Aflaq's fascism. That's the state of the ME, and that's why it must change
posted by Tony Badran at
7:53 PM
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